Problems Caused by the Occupation 
of the Ruhr and the Financial 
Situation Arising from it. 


Text of the Address (Slightly Revised and 
Completed), by Mr. Gaston Liebert, Director 
of the French Bureau of Information in the 
United States, at the Annual Meeting of 
the New York State Bankers' Association. 


Atlantic City, (New Jersey) 
June llth, 1923. 



























1 ) 1*50 

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—THE PROBLEM OF THE REPARATIONS OF 
FRANCE’S DEVASTATED REGIONS—FINAN¬ 
CIAL SITUATION OF THE FRENCH GOV¬ 
ERNMENT AND NATION BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE GREAT WAR. 

—HOW FRANCE FULFILLED HER OBLIGATIONS 
AFTER THE WAR OF 1870-71—VOLUNTARY 
DEFAULT OF PAYMENT ON THE PART OF 
GERMANY AFTER THE TREATY OF VER¬ 
SAILLES. WILFUL DEPRECIATION OF THE 
MARK. EXPORT OF GERMAN CAPITAL. 

—NECESSITY OF A TEMPORARY OCCUPATION OF 
THE RUHR BY FRENCH AND BELGIAN 
TROOPS AS A MEANS OF PRESSURE TO 
COMPEL GERMANY" TO PAY. 


Gentlemen, when I was asked' to speak before you 
about the present situation in Europe and especially about 
the occupation of the Ruhr, in connection with the gen¬ 
eral financial situation here and over there, I thought that 
there could be no better opportunity than this one to make 
a few facts known to you, who are among the most en¬ 
lightened people in this great country. 

My duty is simply to make things a little clearer to 
you, as nothing that I will say is really new. The papers 
print every day long articles concerning Europe, but those 
articles or correspondences are sometimes so confused, they 
contain such a mass of information in very small type, 
that one has not always the time nor the courage to read 
everything that is printed. So it may be of some use that 
I should try and give you a short condensation of facts 
which have all been checked up, and of figures which are 
strictly accurate as they come from absolutely reliable 
sources, some of them from the datas of the Commission of 
Reparations. 

That question of the reparations, linked-up of course 
with the occupation of the Ruhr, is not only a political and 

) 9 

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I ? 


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2 


financial problem, but it is also (and i call your particular 
attention to that fact) a problem of mere honesty and of 
mentality. 

When the Treaty of Versailles was signed 4 years ago, 
all the powers agreed that there should be no such thing 
as a “war-indemnity” imposed upon the vanquished. We 
did away with that old principle of a sort of penalty on the 
vanquished just because he had been unfortunate enough 
to be beaten, but as a matter of justice, it was agreed that 
Germany and her Allies should have to pay for the damages 
of the war which their armies occasioned in Belgium, mostly 
in France and to a certain extent, in Italy and in England. 
It was simply a matter of justice, reparations for actual 
damage done—which is quite another thing from the “war- 
indemnities” which had been imposed upon France after 
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. 

In May 1871, at the Treaty of Frankfort (and pre¬ 
viously, at the preliminaries signed at Versailles in Feb¬ 
ruary 1871), the German Government compelled France, 
among other things consequent to the war, to pay a war- 
indemnity of 5 billions of francs, which nowadays would 
mean probably 20 or 25 billions of francs owing to the 
depreciation since that time in the purchasing value of 
money. Besides, France had to pay that money in gold 
and in German currency, and the expense of the conversion 
charged to France’s debit-account, amounted to 341 mil¬ 
lions of francs. 

That was not all. We had also to pay for the cost of 
the German occupation forces until full payment of the 
war-indemnities, damages caused by German invasions, 
etc. This came to 659 millions of francs. Besides, the City 
of Paris had to pay to the German Army a war-contribution 
of 200 millions of francs. The total was a little over 6 
billion 500 million gold francs. 

That, mind you, was to be paid in gold, in German 
currency and by instalments, the last one, of 3 billions of 
francs falling due on March 2, 1874. 

What did the French Government and the French peo¬ 
ple do after that Treaty had been signed? I am not speak- 

4) »'• 


Gift 

Carnegie Inst. 

AUG 5 1924 


3 


ing here of the territorial clauses, of the cruel necessity 
for us to give up two of our best and most cherished fron¬ 
tier-provinces, Alsace and Loraine, which were grabbed 
from us by Germany. I am speaking only of the financial 
side of the question. 

What the French people did then, was to back up their 
Government, to turn out their pockets, to get all the money 
out of them, to take all their savings out of the banks, to 
subscribe to all the loans put on the market by the 
French Government for the purpose of paying that indem¬ 
nity as rapidly as possible, because the French nation at 
large considered that its plenipotentiaries at Frankfort hav¬ 
ing signed that Treaty, it was a debt of honor on the part 
of every Frenchman to help his government pay that in¬ 
demnity as quickly as possible. (Applause). 

It was a hard thing, a particularly hard one, in those 
days, to pay 6 billion odd francs in such a short time, (3 
years), so much so that Bismarck (advised by Bleischroeder, 
who was the great Berlin financier of that period) consid¬ 
ered it absolutely certain that we would not pay in time 
and he had already anticipated that fact as early as the 
latter part of 1871, and also in 1872, by preparing instruc¬ 
tions to the military commanders of the German Army of 
Occupation, which, as a guarantee of payment were holding 
with their troops all our Northern and Eastern Depart¬ 
ments, in a view to resuming and extending that occupa¬ 
tion if circumstances warranted it; all the orders were ready 
and France would not have been spared had she not paid 
in full and in due time. 

To their utter surprise and dismay, thanks to the 
splendid spirit shown then by the French people who sub¬ 
scribed with the most patriotic devotion to the war debt 
loans put on the market in June, 1871, and July, 1872, 
thanks also to the financial help of some of our foreign 
friends, among whom were some of your great financiers of 
that time, we paid the last cent on the 5th of September, 
1873, six months before the date fixed by the Treaty. (Ap¬ 
plause). This was the attitude of an honest nation, of a 
nation whose first principle has always been to fulfill its 
engagements, no matter how hard it is to do so. 


4 


Compare that with the attitude ,of Germany since the 
signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919: At the Treaty 
of Versailles, no fixed sum of indemnity had been put 
down, for the excellent reason, that at that time, it was 
impossible to obtain complete and accurate valuation of 
the damage caused in France, Belgium and Italy. The 
damage was very large. It affected our factories, our farms, 
our mines (as you know our coal-mines of Lens were utterly 
and wantonly destroyed when the Germans knew they had 
to retire), it even touched our soil, it even touched our 
fruit-trees, which had been cut down without any particu¬ 
lar reason except that of a malicious purpose. The damage 
was tremendous and it was the richest part of France which 
had been wantonly destroyed in that way. It was the part 
which, from an agricultural and also from an industrial 
point of view, was the most productive of all and which 
represented before the war, one-fifth of the total produc¬ 
tion of the country. 

It meant hundreds of thousands of houses; I could tell 
you in detail how many thousands of churches, schools, 
factories there were, that had to be rebuilt ; in some cases 
whole villages had been obliterated and it took consider¬ 
able time for the many technical commissions sent to the 
destroyed areas to ascertain exactly the total damage. So 
it was agreed that a certain commission, called the Com¬ 
mission of Reparations, composed of representatives of the 
Allies, would set to work, concentrate all the information 
gathered on the spot by experts, so as to come to an exact 
valuation. Germany had simply agreed in principle to pay 
the total amount of damages fixed by that Commission, 
which was to tell the German Government before May 1, 
1921, the total amount to be paid. 

Still, before signing that Treaty of Versailles in 1919, 
Count von Brockdorf-Rantzau, who was the chief German 
representative, had tried to obtain that a reduced lump¬ 
sum should be fixed immediately. He offered then 100 bil¬ 
lion gold marks. The Allies thought that certainly, a sum 
so small as that, could not be sufficient to cover all the 
damages, and they considered shortly afterwards that the 
damage probably would come to at least 375 billion gold 
marks. 


5 


The year following, at the Conference of Boulogne, in 
June, 1920, Germany was put down to pay 269 billion gold 
marks, in the following way: 3 billions annually during 42 
years after May, 1921; 3 billions for 5 years and 4 billions 
after May, 1926. 

At the Conference of Spa in July, 1920, Germany 
agreed to deliver 2 million tons of coal monthly, in ex¬ 
change for France’s cash advances. Further occupation of 
German territory was already provided for as a sanction. 
(It is an extraordinary thing that France, being the creditor 
nation and needing coal, should be asked to advance money 
to Germany for coal supplied by the vanquished nation. 
This was one of the most curious things that was ever 
proposed and accepted). 

At Brussels in December, 1920, a new payment-plan 
was devised, making things easier for Germany. 

At Paris, another Conference was held in January, 1921. 
The German debt was scaled down to 226 billion gold 
marks, plus ten per cent on German exports. 

At the Conference of London in March and April, 
1921, the German debt was reduced to 132 billion gold 
marks. (That is the most important figure to remember). 

At London in May, 1921, Germany accepted the above 
decision of all the Allies, of paying 132 billion gold marks. 
A schedule of payment was then drawn up and Germany 
agreed besides to a plan of financial reform. 

At Wiesbaden, in October, 1921, an agreement was 
signed between Mr. Rathenau and M. Loucheur for pay¬ 
ment in kind of part of the reparations. 

At Cannes, in January, 1922, Germany was granted a 
short moratorium and was called upon to submit a plan 
of financial reform. 

At Paris, in March, 1922, at a Conference of experts, 
Sir Robert Horne, Chancellor of the British Exchequer, 
proposed 45 billion gold marks as the negotiable part of 
the German debt. 

At Paris, in March, 1922, the Commission of Repara¬ 
tions made some additional concessions to Germany on the 
schedule of payments, but insisted on financial reforms. 


6 


At Berlin, in July, 1922, Germany agreed to start on 
a new financial policy. 

At London, in August, 1922, Germany asked for a new 
moratorium. 

At London, on August 31, 1922, Germany was granted 
a four months’ moratorium. 

At London again, in December following, the Premiers 
of France, England, Italy and Belgium rejected the Ger¬ 
man proposals. 

Lastly, at Paris, in January, 1923, Mr. Bonar Law’s 
plan was rejected by Mr. Poincare. 

In short, in January, 1923, after 16 conferences or par¬ 
leys, notwithstanding the long and constant patience and 
moderation of the French Government and people, the 
reparations’ problem had not advanced one step nearer its 
solution. The more the Allies reduced their demands, the 
more concessions they made to Germany, the more Ger¬ 
many reduced her offers. 

In 1919, the Allies wanted 375 billion gold marks; Ger¬ 
many offered 100 billions. 

In 1920, the Allies’ demand came down to 269 bil¬ 
lions; Germany offered then only 3 to 4 billions annually 
for a period not defined. 

In 1921, the Allies reduced their demands to 132 bil¬ 
lion gold marks; Germany offered 50. 

In 1922, the Allies declared they would be satisfied 
with 50 billions, but Germany offered nothing and even ap¬ 
plied for an international loan of one billion gold marks 
which she considered necessary to balance her budget and 
stabilize the mark. 

In 1923, the last offer of Germany amounted only to 
30 billion gold marks, with no tangible guarantee and with 
so many strings attached, that this offer represented really 
only about 16 billions of marks, an offer which was really 
absurd. It was so indicated (even if the expression itself 
was not used) by the British Prime Minister in his note 
sent to Germany in answer to that offer. 


7 


As a matter of fact, the total payments made by Ger¬ 
many to all the Allies, or rather to the Commission of Rep¬ 
arations for the account of the Allies, amounted last De¬ 
cember to the following figures: 

Gold Marks 

In cash. 1,878,515,000 

In kind . 3,495,006,000 

State Properties. 2,553,905,000 

Treasury Receipts. 13,000,000 

TOTAL. 7,940,426,000 

Out of that total 5,184,257,000 gold marks were divided 
up among the Allies by the Commission of Reparations; 
2,756,169,000 gold marks have not yet been divided up 
among the Allies and they are kept by the Commission of 
Reparations to the credit of Germany and will be divided 
up later. 

Out of those figures, France received only up to last 
December, 1,791,000,000 gold marks, divided as follows: 

Gold Marks 


In cash . 143,649,000 

In kind . 1,345,112,000 

Cessions in the Saar Valley 302,042,000 


TOTAL . 1,790,803,000 


I am not going to give you here the details of how we 
used that, as I think it is unnecessary for my purpose 
today. 

While Germany, since 1919, has kept whining, com¬ 
plaining to the world that the Allies were demanding too 
much of her as reparations, instead of following the ex¬ 
ample of France after 1870-71 and exerting all of her power, 
all her energy to pay her just debt, she has been all that 
time following the most extraordinary financial policy: Her 
rich and powerful industrialists of the Ruhr notably (and 
also of the other parts of the Reich) have been exporting 
their capital abroad: to this country, to South America, 
to the Scandinavian countries, to Spain, to Switzerland, to 
Holland, even to China, so as to shelter that money in case 
anything should happen and they should be called upon 
to share the financial responsibilities of the whole German 
nation. 












8 


Yes, they have their sound money (gold) deposited 
in banks all over the world and it is said in some quarters— 
although an exact valuation in such matters is almost im¬ 
possible—that these sums amount to at least 4 billion dol¬ 
lars. Such an operation in such circumstances is called 
by a certain name in business, when a debtor deliberately 
conceals his assets in order to defraud his creditors: I am 
not going to use that word, but you certainly understand 
what I mean. 

That is not all. The German Government deliber¬ 
ately caused the depreciation of its currency by manipulat¬ 
ing its mark in the most scandalous fashion, by starting 
without ever stopping, the printing-press going, and hav¬ 
ing it work at such a speed that the mark has gone down 
to practically nothing. Besides, instead of taxing their 
people to the limit of their capacity so as to increase the 
general budgetary resources of the Reich, they allowed them 
to get away with taxes which in 1921, were hardly more 
than one-half per capita what the French tax-payers bad 
to pay. Then the German Government came to us and 
said: “What can we do? We can't pay you in gold. See 
what our currency is worth!” Yes, but who is responsible 
for the depreciation of that currency to a point where it 
takes today more than eighty thousand marks to equal one 
dollar? And we all feel that the mark may even drop very 
much lower. 

There is even something more: There still was money 
left in Germany. The German Government, instead of 
paying its reparations, used it to build a new mercantile 
marine, which is growing more and more powerful each 
year, in improving its canals and other waterways, its rail¬ 
ways (some of them of a strategical value only) and in im¬ 
proving all the public works in Germany. 

Is that the proper attitude of an honest debtor who 
should first of all pay his just debts? What would you 
think in ordinary business, of a person who behaves that 
way? When you have to deal with a man who owes you 
money, who has been unfortunate in his transactions and 
who comes to you, when the date of payment arrives, and 
shows you frankly what his situation is, explains to you his 



9 


condition and applies for consideration, if you are satisfied 
that the man is really honest, that his default in payment 
is not due to his fault or bad will, you will give him time 
and even help him. But if you have had the proof, not 
only once but repeatedly, that your debtor has been dis¬ 
honest with you, that he has put aside his capital, his as¬ 
sets, that he is spending his money wantonly and lavishly, 
instead of putting that money aside in order to pay his 
debts, what would you do? You would demand a receiver¬ 
ship and you would have no pity for him. 

Well, that is exactly what France and Belgium were 
compelled to do at the beginning of the present year when 
they sent their troops into the Ruhr. Those troops went 
there to act as receivers, to collect from a stubborn and 
dishonest debtor, a just debt, a sacred debt. (Applause). 

As I have the honor to speak this morning before men 
of business, before bankers, I take the liberty of presenting 
to you a few more figures. Of course, it is rather dry stuff, 
but I know that men of your standing and technical ex¬ 
perience will excuse me. However, before I read these fig¬ 
ures, I must remind you of a fact which you all know, 
that before the war, before 1914, France was one of the rich¬ 
est nations in the world. She had extraordinary savings, 
she was in a position to lend money to practically the whole 
world. You know that even in this country there were 
important French investments in your railways and many 
other enterprises. 

We lent money to countries in South America, to 
Egypt, to Turkey, to Russia, to China, God knows where. 
There was hardly a big enterprise in the world without 
French capital being called upon to subscribe—and our 
people were then in a position to subscribe and they did 
subscribe. 

The war broke out. Immediately, our first cash-re¬ 
sources were called upon. Then our securities, foreign se¬ 
curities notably, had to be pledged as a guarantee, then 
sold in order to carry on that terrible war. And there 
came a time when all our resources, cash-resources and 
securities, had been handed over as collateral or sold, still 


10 


to carry on that horrible war which lasted very much longer 
than any of us had anticipated at the beginning. 

The loss of men which France sustained were 1,400,- 
000 killed and 700,000 maimed for life, which meant a total 
loss of 2,100,000 young Frenchmen between the ages of 
20 and 35, absolutely wiped out. That, out .of a popula¬ 
tion of only 38,000,000 mind you! That loss was frightful. 
We mourn those young men, those heroic Frenchmen, and 
we know that for at least two generations we will miss them 
tremendously. It means practically two million men, out 
of a population one-third of yours, that are no more, who 
can’t produce any more. Their loss means, without speak¬ 
ing of other considerations, a formidable decrease in the 
productive capacity of the nation, at least for the time 
being. 

Besides that, having expended all our resources in car¬ 
rying on the war for four and a half years, the end of the 
war naturally found us, instead of being a creditor-nation, 
a debtor-nation. We are proud of that situation, because 
it is thanks to those money sacrifices that we were able to 
keep oi}. so long and that we contributed our share to our 
great common victory. So we have no reason of being 
ashamed of the fact that we are today a debtor-nation, 
and that we are experiencing just now the greatest diffi¬ 
culty in balancing our budgets. 

This leads me to give you a few figures concerning 
France’s present financial situation. 

Our internal public debt at the beginning of 1923, 
amounted to 282 billion francs; our external debt to 35 
billion francs. You see, after all, it is not so bad, as our 
external debt is only a slight proportion of our internal 
debt. 

The statement of our budget for 1923 is as follows: 
expenses, 23 billion paper-francs; receipts, 19 billion paper- 
francs; deficit of the general budget: 4 billion paper- 
francs, to which will have to be added for 1923, because of 
Germany’s failure to pay expenses (supposedly recover¬ 
able from her), 10 billion paper-francs. Therefore, the total 
deficit, including the deficit of the general budget, amounts 
to 14 billion paper-francs, which we have managed to elim- 


11 


inate in reducing certain expenditures—notwithstanding 
the fact that they were quite necessary—and by other 
means. 

I come now to a certain explanation I must give you 
concerning the reconstruction of our devastated regions. 
Immediately after the Armistice—which was arranged for 
the sake of humanity in order not to carry on the blood¬ 
shed one day more than what was considered absolutely 
necessary—the French Government, although not altogeth¬ 
er anticipating the difficulties it would meet in obtaining 
from Germany any speedy payment for the damages occa¬ 
sioned, set immediately to work on the reconstruction of 
these devastated regions which had to be put in order as 
soon as possible, so as to enable French industry and 
French agriculture to produce. We could not wait for the 
good-will of Germany in order to put those farms of our 
Northern and North Eastern Departments back into their 
former condition, to rebuild the factories, etc. So, the 
French Government put on the market successive internal 
loans, and also Treasury bonds, to an amount totalling 95 
billions of francs at the end of 1922. 

This amount covered two purposes: reconstruction of 
the devastated regions: 55 billions of francs; war pensions 
(which was also an item provided for in the Treaty of 
Versailles as having to be paid by Germany): 33 billions 
of francs, plus interest on the amounts borrowed for the 
preceding items: 7 billions of francs. Total 95 billions of 
francs. 

That was a tremendous sacrifice for a country of only 
38,000,000 inhabitants, which has suffered through the war 
to the extent France has suffered, not only in men but also 
in treasure. 

And the French Government knew perfectly well at 
the end of last year, that that enormous sum of 95 billion 
francs which today has increased to about 110 billion francs, 
represented very nearly the maximum of the possible sac¬ 
rifices (financial sacrifices) that a nation which had been 
temporarily so impoverished by the war could make and 
Hi at it would be impossible to carry on much longer that 


» > * 


12 


system of loans and subscriptions to Treasury bonds. That 
is why, when Mr. Bonar Law met Mr. Poincare in Paris 
at the beginning of last January, our Prime Minister had 
to make our British friends understand that we had to 
do something, that we had to take coercible measures to 
compel Germany,—who had not suffered in her industries 
and her farms, all left intact by the war—to be honest, that 
we could not go on indefinitely being dragged from con¬ 
ference to parley and from parley to conference, to obtain 
nothing but void promises, either verbal or written. We 
had no guarantee of payment and we received almost noth¬ 
ing from Germany (who less and less realized that she had 
been beaten), except the scant sums which I have just 
given out to you. It could not go on like that, especially 
as, notwithstanding the fact that the French Government 
repeatedly made it known that it would never refuse to 
consider reasonable and “bona fide” proposals from the 
German Government, never received any such offers, so 
we had to find some practical means to make Germany come 
to her senses, to face the stern realities—hard realities, I 
will admit, but not so hard though, as the sacrifices she is 
responsible for and which we have made. That is the ex¬ 
planation of our going into the Ruhr. We went into the 
Ruhr because, for the financial reasons I just gave you, it 
was (in January last), the psychological moment to go in 
there. We chose that particular spot for another reason: 
namely because it is close to the zone occupied by the 
Allied Armies, so we could enter easily and without any 
serious resistance nor bloodshed. But the main reason was 
that the Ruhr, which has properly been called the “jugu¬ 
lar vein of Germany”, is the center of the great German 
production of coal, coke and steel-manufactured goods of 
all kinds. It is the vital spot where those big industrial 
magnates like Stinnes, Thyssen, Krupp and others, made 
out of the war, during the war and since the war, tremen¬ 
dous fortunes, which are now abroad and which have never, 
at any moment since the Treaty of Versailles, been put at 
the disposal of the German Government to help the Reich 
pay the just reparations it is bound to pay, in order to 
compensate France and her Allies for the damages of the 
war. 


K * 


13 


We knew that by occupying that particular spot we 
would be in a position to exert a moral pressure upon those 
recalcitrant people, not only on the German Government, 
but particularly on the big magnates of the Ruhr, and that 
they would begin to think that in the long run, it would be 
more advantageous for them to begin being honest or act¬ 
ing as honest men, rather than continuing being dishonest 
and trying to defraud us indefinitely. 

These are the explanations for our entering the Ruhr— 
to exert a moral pressure on the German Government and 
on the rich magnates of the Ruhr (I mean the heads of the 
big industries there); not for one moment, did we think of 
crushing the German working people; it is not upon them 
that we are exerting our action—we have, on the contrary, 
always treated them justly and even considerately and 
kindly. 

Had Germany shown at any time, any sincere inten¬ 
tion of paying, the French and Belgian troops would not 
have had to be sent into the Ruhr to help collect an ack¬ 
nowledged and just debt. 

As a matter of fact, we have already seen some results 
of that occupation, I mean practical results: when the 
occupation started, one could hear certain people in sev¬ 
eral countries, especially in England and to a certain ex¬ 
tent, here, say they could not see what practical results 
the occupation would bring. Mr. Bonar Law himself, not¬ 
withstanding his perfect courtesy and good faith, left Paris, 
telling Mr. Poincare at the railway-station, that he was 
in full accord with us as to the justice of our cause and that 
he was in deep sympathy with us, notwithstanding the fact 
that he could not very well see what our then projected ac¬ 
tion would come to, what the practical results would be. 
His sympathies were nevertheless with us, although he dis¬ 
agreed with us on the methods of obtaining actual German 
payments. 

Well, the occupation has been in effect now f.or five 
months, and we can see some practical results. I am not 
speaking only of the exports of coal and coke, which are 
increasing more and more regularly and which now reached 
the point where they almost cover the cost of our Army 


of Occupation—that is only a detail; it is a small part of 
the results. In my humble opinion, the main practical 
result obtained from the occupation of the Ruhr is that 
the German Government and the more important German 
industrial magnates, notably those of the Ruhr who felt the 
pressure in a particularly direct manner are at least be¬ 
ginning to realize that in the long run they will gain more 
by paying honestly the reparation the Reich pledged itself 
to pay, than by continuing to evade just sanctions. 

The German Government, in its very last note (I am 
referring to that of last week), notwithstanding the fact 
that its proposals are still absolutely unsatisfactory, admits 
for the first time explicitly that it must meet its obliga¬ 
tions. That is one result. Besides, the former Allies of 
the war seem to be more and more united on the question 
of the reparations; they are now upholding the legitimate 
rights of France, and the points of view of all the interested 
parties on the methods of settling the question of repara¬ 
tions, are, it appears to me, getting nearer every day. 

Then, Germany has at last understood that she will 
never succeed in separating the former Allies on the great 
question of principle, of right and of justice. We may have 
disagreed, we former Allies of the war, as to the methods, 
the best methods, the most practical methods, of obtaining 
payment from Germany, but it is to the honor of our former 
Allies and particularly of the great majority of the people 
of Great Britain and the United States of America, that 
they have always recognized the justice of our cause and 
that we always felt that we had at least their moral sym¬ 
pathy and support. 

The fact that Germany recognizes that she will not 
separate us on that question of reparations, has, I think, 
contributed more than any other thing to open the eyes of 
the Germans, who during the last four years have contin¬ 
ually played that card: trying to make France, Belgium, 
England, Italy and the United States, disagree on the ques¬ 
tion of reparations. It certainly was the best asset Germany 
thought she had in that diplomatic game, but now the 
game is up and our former enemies seem to be beginning 
to understand. 


15 

The occupation of the Ruhr, therefore, has, in my 
opinion, hastened considerably the solution of the grave 
problem of reparations, which is not only an economic 
problem but also a political one, a problem which has 
made its weight felt on the world’s affairs, as well as on the 
financial and commercial activities of all of us and on the 
political intercourse between nations. That dark and 
threatening cloud is beginning to lift at last, thanks you 
will admit, to the firmness, moderation and clearsighted¬ 
ness of the French Government’s policy. 



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